A growing number of states and international organizations, including the EU and the US, are envisaging carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs) as a means to implement their climate policies. From an economic perspective, CBAMs are instruments aiming to level crossborder trade between countries that implement uneven carbon pricing schemes. From a legal perspective, CBAMs arc considered 'general exceptions' tofree trade, whose laufulness is debated in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This article develops a systemic analysis of CBAMs, notably the EU CBAM, tinder general and particular international law, and argues that they could be framed under the specific exception of `countermeasures' under treaty law, particularly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), thus fundamentally establishing a presumption of legality.

Exceptio Inadimpleti Contractus: CBAMs as International Countermeasures

Quirico O
2024-01-01

Abstract

A growing number of states and international organizations, including the EU and the US, are envisaging carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs) as a means to implement their climate policies. From an economic perspective, CBAMs are instruments aiming to level crossborder trade between countries that implement uneven carbon pricing schemes. From a legal perspective, CBAMs arc considered 'general exceptions' tofree trade, whose laufulness is debated in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This article develops a systemic analysis of CBAMs, notably the EU CBAM, tinder general and particular international law, and argues that they could be framed under the specific exception of `countermeasures' under treaty law, particularly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), thus fundamentally establishing a presumption of legality.
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
- JWT.pdf

non disponibili

Licenza: NON PUBBLICO - Accesso chiuso
Dimensione 2.11 MB
Formato Adobe PDF
2.11 MB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12071/49769
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
social impact