While constructing the world’s most ambitious regulatory framework for digital platforms, the European Union has become increasingly dependent on the Us technology firms that the framework is intended to regulate. This paper analyses how Eu institutions have navigated this tension discursively across a quarter century of official texts. Using a mixed-methods corpus analysis of 6,633 mentions of firms drawn from Eur-Lex legislative documents and European Parliament plenary speeches (1999–2025), we apply co-occurrence frame detection, sentiment scoring, and Llm-based role classification to track the positioning of the five major Us Big Tech firms – Amazon, Apple, Google, Meta and Microsoft – across three categories derived from theory: partner/enabler, threat/regulatory target, and quasi-sovereign actor. Drawing on platform power literature, we argue that Big Tech firms occupy a novel structural position within Eu governance, which neither standard competition policy nor digital sovereignty discourse adequately captures. Threat framing predominates in both corpora, but there is a divergence by institutional register: threat framing accounts for 45.3% of mentions in parliamentary speeches, compared to 17.5% in legislative documents. Notably, parliamentary threat framing has escalated markedly since 2016. Rather than resolving over time, partner and threat framings coexist persistently, and firm profiles vary substantially: from Facebook’s predominantly threat-oriented position to Microsoft’s and IBM’s predominantly partner-oriented profiles. While the quasi-sovereign category is sparse overall, it increases in parliamentary speeches after 2016. This suggests that structural-power framing has acquired a political register that it has not yet achieved in legislative texts.
Partners, threats, and quasi-sovereigns: How Eu institutions frame Big Tech in the era of digital sovereignty
Cecilia Emma Sottilotta
2026-01-01
Abstract
While constructing the world’s most ambitious regulatory framework for digital platforms, the European Union has become increasingly dependent on the Us technology firms that the framework is intended to regulate. This paper analyses how Eu institutions have navigated this tension discursively across a quarter century of official texts. Using a mixed-methods corpus analysis of 6,633 mentions of firms drawn from Eur-Lex legislative documents and European Parliament plenary speeches (1999–2025), we apply co-occurrence frame detection, sentiment scoring, and Llm-based role classification to track the positioning of the five major Us Big Tech firms – Amazon, Apple, Google, Meta and Microsoft – across three categories derived from theory: partner/enabler, threat/regulatory target, and quasi-sovereign actor. Drawing on platform power literature, we argue that Big Tech firms occupy a novel structural position within Eu governance, which neither standard competition policy nor digital sovereignty discourse adequately captures. Threat framing predominates in both corpora, but there is a divergence by institutional register: threat framing accounts for 45.3% of mentions in parliamentary speeches, compared to 17.5% in legislative documents. Notably, parliamentary threat framing has escalated markedly since 2016. Rather than resolving over time, partner and threat framings coexist persistently, and firm profiles vary substantially: from Facebook’s predominantly threat-oriented position to Microsoft’s and IBM’s predominantly partner-oriented profiles. While the quasi-sovereign category is sparse overall, it increases in parliamentary speeches after 2016. This suggests that structural-power framing has acquired a political register that it has not yet achieved in legislative texts.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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